



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

any indication of the swing away from the theory of marginal utility; III, 636, the statement on marginal productivity, and the wages fund is poor.

In addition to these points noticed in a casual examination, mention should be made of a few typographical errors: I, 125 ("Berlin Decree") "restored" for "resorted"; I, 131, ("Bimetallism") "monometallists" should read "bimetallists"; I, 313, Leroy-Beauieu should have an *l*; I, 482, Davenport should have "H. J."; I, 651, "whose" should be "where"; II, 85, "service" should be "reserve"; II, 303, Breckinridge should have "S. P." not "S. R."; III, 169 "Redemption of specie payments" should be "resumption," etc.; III, 559 "F. Adams" should be "C. F. Adams," and B. H. Meyer appears without the title of the book (1903). Perhaps some of these errors may seem trivial; but they are unpardonable in a cyclopedia whose very right to existence lies in its accuracy.

L.

Societal Evolution. By A. G. KELLER. New York: Macmillan, 1915. 8vo, pp. xi+338. \$1.50.

To displace Spencer and to accept Darwin as the founder of method in sociology is a major motive of this volume. The author laments the fact that the concept of evolution has not affected the method of the social sciences as thoroughly as it has transformed the physical sciences. Social science, working with Spencerian formulas, has not been empirical and genetic. Dr. Keller quotes approvingly Huxley's joke about Spencer's idea of a tragedy being the destruction of a grand hypothesis by a refractory fact.

Darwin himself was not within his proper field in those chapters in the *Descent of Man* dealing with mental and racial development. Succeeding writers failed adequately to apply the categories of variation, selection, transmission, and adaptation to social phenomena, since they assumed that societal evolution is *analogous* with natural evolution. The author proposes to go beyond reasoning from analogy. He says:

I find a something in the social field which *is* variation whether or not it may be *like* what is called variation in the organic field: similarly social selection *is* selection and not merely *like* it. In the social field, also, there is a means of transmission having the essential attributes of heredity in nature; and adaptation occurs in one range of phenomena as in the other. These factors have their societal mode as they occur in the life of society, just as

they have their organic mode when they appear in the life of organisms [pp. 15-16].

Beginning with a résumé of the distinguishing traits of the human type of evolution, the book offers evidence on societal selection, "automatic" and "rational," counterselection, transmission, and adaptation. The human type of evolution is mental and groupal: action is controlled by means of conventions, "folkways." Societal variation reduces to the mental reactions of individuals (p. 51), which are selected or rejected by an omnipotent complex of group and class "mores." Selection, at first automatic, becomes to some extent rational, guided by utility, method, and forethought (chap. iv). Yet irrationality is strongly fixed in the folkways of civilization. Rational selection is limited, on the whole, to the field of "maintenance-mores": in other words, rational change takes place primarily in the economic arts. Like Sumner, his teacher, Professor Keller insists upon the primitive, original, universal power of economic forces: these forces, reflected in the mores, take on moral and "ideal" clothing. This insistence leads to a good word for the determinism of Marx (pp. 163-64) and sundry shots at the "improvers" and world "beautifiers" who ignore "human nature" and the reign of law in society.

In discussing the societal meaning of transmission the writer depends upon the mechanism of imitation, seeking to show that no imitation or "acculturation" is possible unless the maintenance-mores admit of such transmission of ideas. Concluding chapters adduce instances of adaptation of groups to the surrounding milieu; a primitive isolated group is the Eskimo, a culture-type of adaptation is the frontier life.

The reviewer's impressions, which cannot be justified in detail because of limited space, summarize as follows: (1) The author does not give due credit to the work on Darwinian lines which (to some extent) runs through the literature in this field. To mention Americans only, Ward, Giddings, and Baldwin have used the empirical, evolutionary method. (2) The psychological processes underlying variation and transmission are not convincingly analyzed. Consequently the conditions producing the folkways and the logic of societal change are not advanced beyond a formal statement. Recent criticism of the concept of imitation shows that a psychological technic is fundamental. What has been done in social psychology would have been relevant to the writer's discussion of imitation and rational invention: some reference to the findings of the psychology of religion might have given pause to the saying that "any sociologist knows that to talk of a 'new religion' is

simply playing with words; that there is no real religion that does not rest upon unreasoning fear of the unknown." American specialists in this field are not so sure about it. (3) While it is true that other writers have been influenced by the standpoint of Darwin, a more elaborate exposition of basic evolution-concepts applied to societary development is welcome and appropriate. Each epoch needs a return to the fine temper of Darwin. To call attention to the need and to accompany the call with a wealth of observation, anthropological data, and suggestive interpretation is a noteworthy achievement of Dr. Keller.

E. L. TALBERT

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

The Social Problem. A Constructive Analysis. By C. A. ELLWOOD.
[The Citizens' Library of Economics, Politics and Sociology.]
New York: Macmillan, 1915. Pp. xii+255. \$1.25.

The progressive movement has come to be an object of serious study. Frequent attempts are being made to determine its meaning and program in an accurate manner. The present book aims to furnish a scientific basis for progressivism. For this purpose, first, the author presents a statement and analysis of *the* social problem, which is asserted to be "the problem of human living together"; secondly, he gives a popular statement of his well-known theory of social forces, devoting one chapter to a generalized statement of each of the principal factors in social life: tradition, physical and biologic elements, economic conditions, and spiritual or ideal elements. This is a desirable protest against one-sided theories, but unfortunately in presenting the spiritual element as "the absolutely decisive factor" in social life the author lays himself open to his own criticism; in some places, in fact, he seems even to adopt an ideological interpretation of history, as, for instance, in the explanation of the present war as the result of an erroneous philosophy, with an implicit criticism of those "who look for some more ultimate sources in biologic or economic necessities."

The chapter on economic conditions may be taken as fairly typical of the general method of treatment. After a short statement to the effect that economic conditions are important in social life but do not enchain the soul of man, the chapter is given over entirely to a presentation of the evils of capitalism and the remedy for those evils. The economic analysis of the evils of capitalism is very inconclusive, as is perhaps necessary in a popular statement; for instance, a "just wage" is asserted,